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S.9
«Au moment de la déb[â]cle turque, les chefs kurdes se réunirent, au mois de mai 1919, près de Malatia, à Kahta, pour organiser une action antikémaliste. Le colonel Bell, chef de l'Intelligence Service à Alep, vint les en dissuader au nom de son gouvernement, tout au promettant de la part des Alliés que les aspirations nationales kurdes seraient prises en considération. Le traité de Sèvres était déjà en vue ...» (Nikitine Les Kurdes S.196)
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S.9f
«Trois délégués du Kurdistan Taali Djémiéti; Les Emirs Djéladet et Kamouran Aali Bedr-Khan et Djémil Pacha Zadé Ekrem Bey qui se trouvaient à Malatia en mission, furent attaqués par les forces que Moustafa Kémal dirigea contre eux. Devant cette agression, ils se retirèrent sur les montagnes de Kahta pour organiser une force Kurde et chasser ces hordes que Moustapha Kémal avait envoyé contre eux. Ils avaient déjà réuni quelque 3000 hommes lorsque le même colonel Bell arrivant à Malatia leur manda un officier anglais, Major Noel, qui au nom du Gougernement Anglais les pria d'avoir à se retirer immédiatement. Ils durent s'exécuter car de ne point suivre ce Conseil c'était en combattant les Turcs avoir les Anglais sur le dos.» (Chirguh [Bedir Khan] La question kurde S.29; mit Setzfehlern wiedergegeben)
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S.21
“The many forms of speech known to outsiders as Kurdish do not constitute a single, unified langugage. Instead it can be said that the various Kurdish dialects, which are clearly interrelated and at the same time distinguishable from neighbouring but more distantly related Western Iranian languages, fall into three main groups. The differences between dialects are generally proportional to their distance apart and beyond a certain distance certainly make them mutually unintelligible.” (Bois „Stichwort: Kurds, Kurdistan“ S.479)
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S.28
“For pragmatic reasons I use a rather loose and wide definition, including all native speakers of dialects belonging to the Iranic languages Kurmanşi or Zaza, as well as those Turkish speaking persons who claim descent from Kurmanşi or Zaza speakers and who still (or again) consider themselves as Kurds.” (van Bruinessen „The Ethnic Identity of the Kurds“ S.613)
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S.29
“Many Shafi‘i Kurds, in fact, refuse to consider the Alevis and Yezidis as Kurds. Intermarriage between these religious groups is extremely rare, much rarer than between Turkish and Kurdish Alevis or even Turkish and Kurdish Sunnis. It might, in fact, be more apt to consider the Kurds not as one, but as a set of ethnic groups [...]” (ebenda S.614)
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S.30
“Other, secondary symbols are even less apt to define a boundary: ‘Kurdish’ dress, music, folklore, cooking, etc. show great regional variations, while the similarities with those of other ethnic groups in the same region are sometimes striking.” (ebenda S.614f)
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S.31
“These symbols of separateness have since the late 1920s been suppressed by the republican Government, which paradoxically made it possible for the nationalist movement of the 1970 to promote a re-invented, more unified Kurdish tradition [...]” “People started wearing Kurdish clothes again – in many cases a fancy dress, based on that worn by the Iraqi Kurds.” (ebenda S.614f und S.620f)
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S.38
“The Dumbuli (Dümbeli), for instance, are mentioned in the Šarafnama as a Kurmangi-speaking tribe, originally Yezidis but later converted to Sunni Islam. Part of tribe having moved from the mountains south of Lake Van to the area of oy, their chieftains allied themselves with the Safavids [...] During the following centuries, the Dumbuli continued to play a prominent role in regional politics, gradually Turkicising. At present, all Dumbuli are turcophone Twelver (ithna ‘ašari) Shi‘is. An example of the reverse development is the Karakeçili tribe, seminomads living on the slopes of the Karacadag mountain to the southwest of Diyarbakïr. They are kurdophone, but according to local tradition they were originally Türkmen from Western Anatolia, who had been settled in this region by Sultan Selim I after the Ottoman conquest. Sections of the Karakeçili who stayed behind in Western Anatolia retained their Türkmen identity; the ones settled on Karacadag gradually Kurdicised, as a result of intermarriage and the incorporation of Kurdish allies into the tribe.” (ebenda S.618)
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S.38b
“Rarely do analysts using supposed ethnic names probe their actual usage: it is too easily assumed, for example, that Baluch, Kurd and Pathan are comparable identities, that each one keeps the same meaning wherever it is used, and that each represents a ‘real’ unity of origins and culture. An examination of the immensely varied and complex popular discourses shows that cultural identities, whether ‘ethnic’, ‘tribal’ or otherwise, make sense only in social contexts. They are essentially negotiable subjects of strategic manipulations; individuals claim status and present themselves, in different ways in different contexts, and how they do so depends particularly on power relations and on local hierarchies – but also on policies and categorisations by the state.” (Tapper „Minorities and the Problem of the State“ S.1030)
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S.41
“Mediaeval Arab geographers used the term ‘Kurd’ (in its Arabic plural form ‘Akrad’) to denote those nomadic (or semi-nomadic) tribes that were neither Arab nor Turk. This includes tribes that even the most extreme of Kurdish nationalists would nowadays not reckon among his nation. Occasionally even Arabic-speaking nomads were called ‘Akrad’ [...]” (van Bruinessen Agha, Shaikh and State S.124)
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S.43
«Pourtant, hameau minuscule ou village important, le peuplement montagnard est perdu d'ordinaire dans un espace trop large, de circulation difficile, un peu comme ces premiers centres du Nouveau Monde, noyés eux aussi dans un espace surabondant, en grande partie inutile ou hostile [...] La montagne est obligée de vivre sur elle-même pour l'essentiel, de tout produire, vaille que vaille, de cultiver la vigne, le blé et l'olivier, même si le sol ou le climat s'y prêtent mal.» (Braudel La Méditerranée et le monde méditerranéen Bd.1 S.29)
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S.45
“Even on the level of the tribe unity against outsiders may remain restricted to the domain of ideology. [...] In case of conflict between two tribes it may happen that a section of one of them makes common cause with the other one – either because of a internal (blood) feud that is taken very seriously, or (more frequently) because the sectional leader has an axe to grind with the paramount chieftain. [...] there were perpetual struggles for leadership of the tribe. Each of the rivals tried to manipulate the socio-political environment in order to get the better of the others. For such people the relevant classification is not 'my tribe' vs 'the other tribes' but 'the power sources my rivals are tapping' vs 'the power sources I might tap'. [...] Manipulation of the central state in order to get the upper hand in a local, tribal conflict is a recurrent theme in Kurdish history.” (van Bruinessen Agha, Shaikh and State S.71f)
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S.55
“[...] the fall of the Ayyubids was followed by one of the darkest periods of Kurdish history. The Mongol horde swept over Kurdistan [...] For two and a half centuries (1260-1502) the power of the Ilkhans Mongols and that of Tamerlane and his successors was constantly resisted by the Kurds [...] Once the tempest had passed, the native inhabitants rebuilt their ruins, and in a few years re-established their industrial and commercial concerns.” (Bois The Kurds S.139)
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S.57
“[...] the early history of the Kurds cannot be reconstructed with any certainty. Unfortunately, the scarcity of evidence and the romanticizing of the Kurds by Americans and Europeans [...] has resulted in an outpouring of pseudo-scholarly nonsense, propounding wild theories that can never be conclusively disproved.” (Limbert „The Origins and Appearance of the Kurds“ S.48)
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S.83
“[...] every attempt at building an empire, since it required centralisation of power and administration, had to work against the owners of the great suyûrghâls.” (Fragner „Social and Internal Economic Affairs“ S.508)
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S.87
“After nine centuries (639-1502) of utter suppression and laceration Persia raised her head again, and, under the leadership of Shah Ismail Safavi restored her united sovereignty [...]” (Safrastian Kurds and Kurdistan S.39)

S.93
“[...] government, whether by foreigner or by native, is exercise of power; and power, it is commonly and rightly said, sets up barriers, isolates, puts him who exercises it in a different world from him who is subject to it. Those who have power and those who do not have power are different species of men.” (Kedourie „Introduction“ S.134)

S.96
“The Safavids' political organisation was openly tribal [...] This tribal organisation clearly rivaled the sedentary structure of the Ottoman [...] enterprise [...] it was modeled not on the Persianized bureaucracies of classical Islam but on the Mongol political tradition, passed on in Anatolia by the Kara Koyunlu and Ak Koyunlu confederations [...] The Safavids provided the nomads their acceptable alternative, and they seized it.” (Lindner Nomads and Ottomans S.110)


Günter Max Behrendt
E-Mail: g.behrendt@mbox.ipw.uni-hannover.de

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